State of Utah v. Jesse Bautista & John Francis Bautista : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972
State of Utah v. Jesse Bautista & John Francis
Bautista : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney; Attorney for Plaintiff-RespondentWilliam
D. Marsh; Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Bautista, No. 13007 (Utah Supreme Court, 1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3296
IN THE SUPREME, 
.•. , ~--. !'. 
OF THE ST A TE .'- -_ --·:~4-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaiflliff··----111 
I~ _,,._ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ST.\TE.\!E.'\T OF THE .'\:\ TCRE OF THE CASE ---------------- 1 
Df.<.;,PC )SJTI< ).'\ I.'\ LO\\'ER COL'RT ---------------------------------------- 1 
RELIFI .SOl"CHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------------------ 1 
ST.\ l E.\tE.'\T OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
ARLL'.\IF.'\T __ _ ----·-----·------·------------------------------------------------------ 5 
l'CW\T T. THE TRL\L COCRT DID NOT ERR IN 
IJISPL\YI:\<: .\ C:O-DEFEXDANT, NOT ON 
TRL\L. TO THE Jl"RY FOR IDENTIFICATION 
Pl .RP< JSES \\'HILE CHAIXED. HANDCUFFED, 
l -'\.SI I.\ \"E'.\L l":\GROO\fED AND DRESSED IN 
CO.\f\I( )'.\ JAIL :\ TTIRE. -----·-------------------------------------------- 5 
PO! .\T I I. THE TRI:\L COl"RT DID NOT ERR IN 
.f.\ I LI\"<; TO CR,\:\T A \fISTRIAL BASED ON 
Tl IF PROSFCl "TOR'S ALLEGED DERISIVE 
ST \TF\!F.'\TS CO.'\CER'.\I:\'G DEFENDANTS' 
R \Cl.\L :\.'\I> SOCI:\L B:\CKGROl'ND. ------·------·-··-······ 11 
POJ \T JI I. THE TRI.\L C:Ol"RT DID NOT ERR IN 
RF I l ·s I .'\C TO EXCl'SE PROSPECTIVE JURORS 
r< >R C :.\ l "SE. ____ -----·------·-----------------·--··-------------------- 16 
POI.\ I' IV. THERE IS :\0 Cl"\IVLATIVE EFFEC-
1 l\T FRR< ms Jl"STIFYI:\G :\ REVERSAL IN 
I !IF I :\ST.\:\T C:.\SE. ----·--------------------------·-------·------------------ 25 
CO.\CLl 'SIO:\ .. ·-------·-·---·---·---··--·--------·--··--------------------······ 26 
C:\SES CITED 
Cl1:qi11i;111 \. C:;diforni;1. 306 l'.S. 18 ( 1%7) ----------------····------------ 16 
D,1,Jwro"r1 \. St:1tc. 3:i7 P.2d 23fi ( 1960) ----------------------------------···· 14 
C.1tt'\1ood \.Sutt'. 1:,7 P.2d i-73. 80 Okla. Cr. 135 (1945) ........ 14 
C;tt('' '· St;1tc. ()0 Okh Cr. 380. 214 P.2d 451 (1950) ---············· 14 
Cr('l't_; ,_ St:1tc. ti() OkLt. Cr. 103. IOI P.2d 289 (1940) .............. 15 
Cn·gon \ _ l'11itcd SL!tcs. 3h'.> F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1966) ............ 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued 
Page 
Guldin v. State, 63 Ariz. 223, 161 P.2d 121 ( 1945) ··----------·-··-··-·· 15 
Irvin v. Dodd, 366 U.S. 722 ( 1961) ______ -----------------------------------·--- 24 
People v. Lopez, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16 ( 1963) _________ -· 14 
Rose v. State, 450 P.2d 527 ( 1969) _____________________ ------------------------- 8 
State v. Archuletta, 501 P.2d 263 ( 1972) __________________ -------------·--- 8 
State v. Brown, 35 Wash.2d 379, 213 P.2d 305 (1949) _______________ 14 
State v. Convey, 23 Wash.2d 539, 161 P.2d 442 ( 194'.)) _____________ 23 
State v. Dillon, 104 Ariz. 33, 448 P.2d 89 ( 1968) _______________________ 14 
State v. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P.2d 692 ( 1935) ________________ 7 
Statev. Hartman, 101L'tah298. 119 P.2d 112 (19-H) ____________ 7 
State v. ~fusser. 110 l!tah 534, 175 P.2d 724 ( 19+6) _______________ 22 
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 163, 389 P.2d 469 (1%4) ______ -----· 25 
State v. Smith. 119 W.\'a. 347, 193 S.E. 573 ( 1964) ________________ 16 
State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230. 282 P.2d 323 (I <JYi) ___________ 25 
State v. Washington. 136 La. 855, 67 So. 930 (191r>) ------------------Ii 
State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 P. 1104 ( 1917) _____ ______ 7 
Wingate v. State, 232 So.2d 4-t (Fla. App. 1970) ------------------------ 16 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF VTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs -
.JESSEE BAUTISTA and 
.JOH~ FRANCIS BAVTISTA, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
13007 
ST.\TE~IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Thr appellants, Jessee and John Francis Bautista, 
appeal from the convictions of rape and robbery entered 
against thrm in the Second Judicial District Court, 
\\'<'bcr County. State of Vtah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Thr appellants were charged by information with 
thr crimes of rape and robbery. Upon pleas of not guilty 
a jury trial was held and appellants were each found 
guilt\· of rape and robbery and committed to the Utah 
State Prison for ten years to life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the convictions should be 
affirmed. 
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ST.-\TE:\lEl\'T OF FACTS 
Respondent b.1sically agrees with the app<'llant's 
chronological summation of the e\·iclencc aclcluccd at 
appellants' jury trial. Hm\T\Tr, certain charactrrizatiom 
of the nature of the e\·idcnce contained in appclants' 
brief arc rC'pucliatccl by JTsponclcnt and. berathe thr,c 
characterization.-; constitute part of appellants' lcQ"al ar-
gument, respondent \\·ill rebut them in the fnllm,·ing 
arguments. 
Appellants imply that the prosccutrix \\·as not forced 
off the road and abducted bv the cldendants. but that 
they merely pull eel up along side her, ,,·histkd and \\·ai\ cd 
at her, and that she then willingly pull<'d O\'cr and 
stopped for them. Appellants imply that the prnsccutrix 
was confused in her O\\n mind as to ,,·hcthcr she stoppnl 
willingly or ,,·as forced off the road, and stated that 
"under cross-examination, she stated the other auto 
merely pulled up along side her and did not pull in front 
of her." They also imply that the prosccutrix ,,·as con-
fused as to \\·hether the defendants had a pistol or not. 
These aq:!:uments are spuriou.s and \\holly unfounded, a' 
the facts of record clearlv indicate. 
On direct examination, the pro..,ecutrix stated that 
the defendants pulled out to pass her. As they came along 
side her, she had to \'Cer m·cr to the right side and stop. 
Two mC'n then jumped out from the car, ran m-cr to her 
car, and immediately jumped into hn car, one in the 
front passenger side and one in the dri\Tr\ Sl'at. She 
testified that thcv had a _gun and told her to get in the 
micldlc (R. 11<1,· 120). She further stated that _-,he did 
not stop \·oluntarilv, and that it happened so List thl'n· 
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,ras nothing she could do to avoid it. When questioned 
,\·ith respect to the gun, she stated that the person on 
the passenger side had a gun in his hand, although she 
could not describe it ( R. 122). 
On cro-.s-cxamination. the prosecutrix related the 
same fach as stated above. Contrary to the implication 
in appcll::tnts' brief that on cross-examination "she stated 
the other auto merely pulled along· side her and did not 
pull in front of her.'' the record establishes (R. 145-152) 
that sh<' \\·as run off the road and forceably abducted . 
. .\pp<'llants indicate that at no time did the prose-
cutri.\ attempt to sound an alarm or make an escape. 
Tlw record ckarh· reflects. howe,·er, that she was placed 
in the n'ar srat of a two-door car. with two defendants 
in th<' front. and onr in thr back with her at all times. 
Sh<' sLttcd that ''I didn't make anv attempt to get away 
l)(c;1 u-..<' I t bought they were real dangerous, the way 
thn made me belic\T. I beliC\-cd they were going to 
'hoot it nut." (R. 174). It is difficult to ascertain just 
11 hat kind of heroic antics appclants would expect from 
:1 \<Hiil\.!: girl placed in these circumstances . 
. \pp'.'lbnts imply in their brief that the prosecutrix 
rnnpna tcd in rcmm·ing at least some of her clothing. 
Tlw record rdkcts. ho\\T\Tr, that she struggled and 
fou!_!ht with them and begged them not to do anything 
tn hn. :\t one time, cluring the struggle to disrobe her 
,Jic begged. "No. my chastity means more than my life 
tn nw." upon which the assaulting defendant stated, 
"Ob\·, gin· me the gun," ancl he reached into the front 
q·;1t (R. 1:rn). She further stated, "A man in the front 
v\1t grabbed my hand and told me to cooperate with 
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them, they were dangerous and if I did just what they 
told me to they wouldn't hurt me and I had better do it. 
There was nothing else I could do." ( R. 131 ) . 
On cross-examination she again stated she struggled 
and fought to pre\'ent her clothes being remo\·ed. After 
being hit in the head or chest and threatened with a 
gun she realized that resistance was futile (R. 165-168). 
Appellant stresses the fact that when the Ogden 
police stopped the vehicle, they saw a boy and girl in 
the back "and they appeared to be embraced most of 
the time." The prosecutrix stated that when the police 
arrived, the defendant in the back with her remo\'ed 
the hat from her eyes so it wouldn't look suspicious. He 
then put his arms around her and told her not to try 
anything ( R. 136). She stated that she knew they had a 
gun and though they were realy takin,g her back to her 
car, so did not attempt a warning to the police ( R. 13 7). 
The fact that the police officers thought the couple in 
the back were boyfriend-girlfriend was as planned by 
defendant. 
One officer at the scene testified that he saw the man 
in the back put his arm around the girl as he pulled up, 
and that the girl 
"had a white object on her head. It looked as if 
it were a night ski cap or something of that srni. 
It was pulled down more on the side of her face 
and clown o\'er her face a little bit, whether she 
did it or he did it. I don't know, but it did seem 
to slide clown mTr her face, someone pulled it. 
He did, as I mentioned, put his arm around her 
at that time.'' ( R. 218). 
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Defense counsel called Robert Gallegos (R. 248), al-
leged Iv employed at a service station where defendants 
made a stop while the prosecutrix was being held in the 
car. His was the only testimony actually indicating that 
the girl was cooperating with the defendants and not 
apparently being held by force. He stated that the girl 
said "put three dollars in," and paid for the gas. He also 
stated that there was no indication of any problems and 
that they appeared to be going steady and having a good 
time ( R. 2-10). Later it was determined that Gallegos 
could not possibly have witnessed the above occurrence, 
as he testified under oath. The respondent established 
bv jail records and direct testimony that on the evening 
in question Gallegos was incarcerated in the Weber 
County Jail (R. 275, 279). 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
TIIF TRIAL COCRT DID NOT ERR IN DISPLAYING 
:\ CO-I >El'f'.\D:\:\'T '.\OT O:'\ TRIAL, TO THE JURY FOR 
ll>F'\TIFIC..\TIO:\' PCRPOSES WHILE CHAINED, HAND-
Cl TFFI >. l.'.\SH:\ \"E:\'. U:'\GROOMED, AND DRESSED IN 
C0\!\10:\ J.\IL ATTIRE. 
Respondent contends that the appearance of the co-
dcfcndant. Batchrlor, at the trial for identification pur-
poses. and his appearance in prison attire was not so 
indicatiH~ of his prisoner status as to prejudice the de-
frnclants' trial. The trial judge's ruling to that effect 
~hould be sustained. 
This incident took place during the direct examina-
tion of Gilbert Gallegos, witness for the defense. Over 
object ions of defense, the judge brought Batchelor into 
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court for identification purposes. Gallegos was asked if 
Batchelor had been with the defendants and prosecu-
trix "·hen they pulled into his service station on the 
night in question: Gallegos stated that he was absolutely 
positi\'e that Batchelor was not in the car, and that he 
had ne\·er seen him in his life. Batchelor was then im-
mediately remo\'ed from the court. 
Defense counsel objected to Batchclor's appC'arance 
in jail attire. The court statC'd: 
"Let the record show that Batchdor has been 
brought clm\n, and that he is in jail clothes ancl 
the defcnsc makes a motion to redress him hcforr 
they put him in thc court room. Thc court denies 
this. I hclin·c the jury understands that he is in 
jaiL and he has jail clothes on. and he has been 
brought in in irons and is handcuffed." 
The court then proceeded to bring in the co-defend-
ant. but indicated that he could not be in chains and 
leg irons ( R. 2:J-l ) . 
In proceedings in chambers defense again objected 
to the introduction of Batchelor in jail attire and re-
quested a mistrial. Such objection was based upon the 
fact that: 
":\Jr. Batchelor ,,·as brow~ht in in jail clothes 
with hi.;; shirt-tail out and unsha\'Cll \\ith his hair 
uncombed and apparently no attempt to alert him 
to the fact that he was going to be introduced at 
trial." 
The judl(e then questioned the jailer as to Batchclor's 
appearance. The jailer stated that this was the way he 
dresses all the time and that he never shaves. He statrd 
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that Batchclor's hair was combed when he was brought 
into court and that he was dressed in the regular jail 
apparel ( R. 282). 
The prosecutor stated that the sole purpose of call-
inl! Batchelor was strictly for identification purposes. 
He ga\·e no testimony. He just sat in the courtroom and 
\\·as silent and no testimony was elicited from him, nor 
\HTC there any plans to elicit testimony from him (R. 
284). 
Ddcnse indicated that his objection was not directed 
to \\ hcther or not the identification was proper or im-
propf'r, but that his objection was to the condition in 
\\·hich he was brought into the court (R. 285). The 
judge then stated that he felt the defendant did not look 
that hacl. that he looked like an ordinary prisoner, and 
on·rrtdccl the objection, in order to avoid delay of the 
trial. 
Tlw derision of the trial court not to permit a con-
tim1:111rc or further delay but to allow the co-defendant 
to appear before the jury in jail attire is a matter for 
th<' sound discretion of the trial judge. In State v. Hart-
man,]()] l'tah 298. 104. 119 P.2d 112 (1941), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that: 
"The granting of a continuance in a criminal 
ca.se is discrctionarv with the court, and its re-
fusal to grant a continuance is not reversible error 
unless clearly prejudicial." 
Other cases so holding are State v. Fairclough, 86 
l 1tah '.r~h .. 14 P.2d 692 ( 1935), and State v. Williams, 
,19 l'tah 1'.!0. 161P.1104 (1917). It is also a matter of 
the discretion of the court if the delay requested does 
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not rise to the "dignity'' of a continuance. 88 C.JS. 
Trial. Section 45. 
Gregory v. Cnitcd States, 365 F.2cl 203, 205 (8th 
Cir. 1966), outlines the standard of re\·iew for a case 
involving judicial discrrtion and the presumption of in-
nocence. In Grrgorr, the cldendant was seen by two 
members of the jury in handcuffs. The l'nited States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rnkd that it 
was not prejudicial error and said: 
"To justify a nc\\· trial this alle.ged error must 
appear to ha\'C scriously affected the fairness of 
the trial. The burden of proof to sustain thi." al-
legation is on the appellant. The handling of the 
defrndant during the trial is best rcgulatecl by 
the trial court and is a mattcr for its sound dis-
cretion. For this court to question the di.-;rretion 
of the trial court, the rccord needs to shm, some-
thing more than the mere fact ddcndant \\'as 
handcuffed in the presence of the jury.'' (citations 
omitted) 
In Ros(' v. State, 4'.iO P.2cl 527 ( 1969), the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that it is not sufficient 
merely to claim prejudice because the dcfrnclant "as 
tried in jail clothes. The court held the record must sho\\' 
how the defendant \\·as prejudiced by shm,·ing the kind 
of clothing he was \\Taring. Appellant had not sho\\TI 
that his appearance as clcscribcd in the record has preju-
diced his case or destroyed for him the presumption of 
mnoccnce. 
In Statr v. Arlzufrtta, :"'J()l P.2d 263 ( 1972), the lTtah 
Supreme Court very recently aclclressecl itself to this 
issue. Herc, the dcfcnclant was found guilty of robbery. 
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Thr onh issue raised as a basis for reversal was that the 
court rrrccl in overruling defense objection to proceed-
ing with thr trial while he was dressed in what he char-
acterizes as "jail clothing." In sustaining the lower court 
the Sta tr Supreme Court held: 
"Thr concern of the court is not whether there 
may be some irregularity, or a failure to meet the 
desire or convenience of the defendant or his 
counsel. It is whether the defendant is placed at 
some disackantage or difficulty resulting in preju-
dice \\·hich deprived him of a fair trial in the 
srnsc that there is some reasonable likelihood that 
in its absence there may have been a different 
result. Ina.-;much as it is the responsibility of the 
trial judge to sec that the trial is fairly conducted 
and hr is in the brst position to observe such cir-
cumstances. the determination of the question 
ju-.;t stated must necessarily rest within his sound 
cli.;;cretion; and because this reviewing court is in 
a lc-.;s ach-antaged position, we will not reverse 
hi.-.; judgment thereon unless it is clearly shown 
that he has abused his discretion. 
There is nothing shO\\TI in the instant case to 
pcr-.;uacle us that the trial judge did so abuse his 
di-.;crction. The defendants' attire is not of an 
unusual nature for voung men, and it is not neces-
sarih· associated \~ith ]ails. Even if it were, it 
clrn< not strike us that there would be anything 
strange, shocking, or prejudicial if the jury be-
came a\\·an' that a man who had been arrested 
and charged with robbery was in custody and 
being held in jail." (Emphasis added) 
The appellant states that the jury, seeing Batchelor 
in jail clothes. would have instilled in their minds the 
idea that his defendants were "a worthless lot," thus 
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prejudicing their chances for a fair trial. Howr\'er, 
Batchelor \\·as a third party witness. not on trial "·ith 
the defendants. \\Then brought into court, it \\·as estab-
lished that he had not been \\·ith the defendants on the 
night in question. then he \\·as tTmm·cd from the jury's 
presence. The appellant is far from com·incing in stating 
that such an appearance by a third party prejudiced the 
defendants' chances for a fair trial in the sense that thrre 
was a reasonable' likelihood that in its absence there mav 
ha\T been a diff crent result. 
In a minorit\· of jurisdictions. some com·ictions ha\-r 
been re\Trsed for clefcnclants' appearance in pri-;on 
clothing. \\·hen the pri-;oner -;tatus of the clefcnclant has 
been indicated by \\·ords or numbers printed on the 
clothes. In all such cases. the issue im·oh-ccl the defend-
ants' thcm-;ch-cs being in such attire. There arc no juris-
dictions holding that the presence of a witness in j;1il 
attire. not a clcfenclant in the trial itself. \\·oulcl han· a 
prejudicial effect on the defendants f)('ing tried. The 
cases cited by the appellant in his argument arc all dis-
tinguishable in that they relate to the dcfrncbnts thcm-
sehTs appearing before the court in jail attire. and arc 
not extended to third parties not on trial. 
The Supreme Court in Archu/tfta, indicated that the 
defendants' claim of prejudice \\·as further minimized 
by the fact that the court instructed th<' jury that the 
mnc fact the defendant had been charged with an of-
fense "as not only c\'ickncc of guilt and was not e,·cn a 
circumstance to be considered in determining guilt or 
innocense (:->01 P.'.:!cl '.:!6-1). 
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In the instant case, the following instructions were 
gi\'cn to the jury by the trial court: 
Instruction No. 4: 
"The fact that the defendants have been 
charg-ccl with a crime and have been held to 
answer thereto is not to be regarded as any evi-
<~cnce of their guilt and no inference or presump-
t 1011 acl\'erse to them should be drawn because of 
those facts.'' 
For the reasons stated abo\'e, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the co-defendant, Batch-
elor, to enter the court in jail attire and the decision of 
tlw trial court to O\'errule appellants' request for a mis-
trial \hould be affirmed. 
POl:\'T II 
Tl IE TRI:\L C:Ol"RT DID :\'OT ERR IN FAILING TO 
< .R.\YI' .\ \I ISTRl.\L BASED O:\' THE PROSECUTOR'S 
.\LLFCEI > lffRISl\"E ST.\TE\lE:\'TS CO~CERNING DE-
n \I> \'\'IS R:\CL\L A:\'D SOCIAL BACKGROUND . 
. \ppdlants in their brief have resorted to material 
omis-.,io11\ and distortion of fact clearly presented in the 
comt record regarding the prosecutor's closing state-
mrnts. Such disto11ions and omissions in appellants' brief 
"nc prepared in an attempt to manufacture prosecu-
tori;tl misconduct "·here none existed . 
. \ppcllants ciuote the following from the record as 
the prosecutor\ statement: 
"\Vhv would she go out with a person not of 
her own. racc, a per;on she never knows, and a 
person that allegedly flags her down on Washing-
12 
ton Boulevard? ... and anybody that would do 
that is about as low an indivi.dual that ;·ou will 
ever come across." 
Appellants then argue that such comments disparage 
the appellants and appeal to racial and social bias. 
Examination of the record, ho\\'C\'Cr, reflects the fol-
lowing conversation by the prosecutor (R. 323-325): 
"Next, you have to ask yoursekes, if .Jill Bate-
man is going to engage in sex. illicit scx. \\·hv is 
she going to choose these t\\·o indi\·iduals ri.ght 
here? \Vhat is there about these t\\·o peoplc o\·cr 
here that is so appealing? .Jill Bateman, a daugh-
ter of a dentist. a daughter of a school teacher. a 
student at \\' eber State College. a cicntal techni-
cian, by her O\\'TI testimony is a religious girL a 
virgin, why would she go out \\·ith this caliber of 
individual? She belongs to a social soorrity. From 
such you can dra\\' thc implication that she \\·ants 
to meet similar situated peoplc as her. peoplr 
with her 0\\11 background. people she can empa-
thize with. people that she feels familiar with, 
perhaps meet somebody that somc clay can sup-
port her in thc manner in which she is accus-
tomed. \Vhy \\'oulcl shc go out \\·ith a person 
not of her m,·n race, a person shc never knO\\·s. 
and a person that allegedly flags hcr cJm,11 on 
\Vashington Boulevard? 
"Do you think that .Jill Batcman is that kind 
of a girl? Arc you going to bclin'C Jill Bateman, 
or arc you going to bclicvc these individuals here, 
an individual alrcaclv has onc felony count against 
him not just anv f~lonv count, but a.'isault with 
a d~adly weapon' - not unrelated to the alleged 
charge here, deadly weapon, in this case. \Vho 
arc you going to believe? \Vhat docs .Jill Bateman 
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have in common with these fellows? She has ab-
solut~ly nothii:tg. These people would be repre-
he?s1?le to. Jill Bateman_. !here was smoking, 
dnnkm~ gomg on, and this is not the kind of ac-
tivity that she would engage in, illicit sex is not 
the kind of activity she would engage in. 
"\Vhat did Mr. Jess Bautista here testify to? 
\Veil, he separated from his wife. What did Jill 
sav. that one of the fellows said he hadn't had sex 
fo~ six months. \Vhat were they doing? They were 
dragging up and down the boulevard looking for 
girls. They found a girl. They had to run her 
off the road to find her though. They had to put 
a gun to her and three of them had to take her 
out west here somewhere and then three of them 
tak<'s turns with this girl. That is how they had 
their sex that night. And anybody that would do 
that is about as low an individual that you will 
ever romc across. Anybody that would make a 
girl submit to something like that is about as low 
a person as you will find." 
It is clear from the full record, taken in context, that 
t lie prosecutor's remarks were directed to the type of 
condurt that the prosecutrix would not be associated 
"ith - such activities as smoking, drinking, illicit sex-
ual activities that would be reprehensible to the prose-
cutrix regardless of the race or social background of 
those participating. 
It is also obvious that the prosecutor, when he made 
the statement that: 
"Anybody that would do that is about as low 
an individual that you will ever run across. Any-
one that will make a girl submit to something 
like that is about as low~ person as you will find." 
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He was not referring to the racial and social back-
ground of the appellants, as they imply. He was obvi-
ously referring to anyone that would forceably abduct a 
young girl and rape her at gunpoint. 
The appellant relics solely on a 1915 Louisiana 
case, State v. JVashington, 136 La. 855, 67 So. 930 
(1915), as a basis for its argument. Such comments as 
were made by the prosecutor in this Louisiana case should 
be reversible error. Hm\"C\·er, the case is distinguishable 
on its facts. Clearly, no such disparaging and biased re-
marks were made by the prosecutor in the instant case, 
as the record above reveals. 
Great latitude should be g1\Tn to both counsel for 
state and dcf endant and a \\·ide freedom of expression 
is authorized in presenting their closing arguments. (;ates 
v. State, 90 Oki. Cr. 380, 214 P.2d 451 ( 19-10); State v. 
Dillon, 1 O+ Ariz. 33. 448 P.2d 89 ( 1968) ; Dash croon v. 
State, 357 P.2d 236 ( 1960); People v. Lope:, 32 Cal. 
Rptr. 424, 38+ P.2d 16 ( 1963). 
The prosecutor, in his closing arguments to the jury, 
is permitted to draw reasonable deductions from evicknce 
offered in the case. Gatewood v. State, 1-17 P.2d 473. 80 
Okla. Cr. 135 ( 194:>); State v. Brown, 35 \\'ash. '.hi 379, 
213 P.2d 30;) ( 1949). The record reveals in the instant 
case that the prosecutor clid confine his final arguments 
to the evidence and reasonable deductions that could be 
clra\\n therefrom, and such argument did not constitute 
misconduct. 
The fact that the prosecutor indicated that anyone 
who would commit such a crime is "as low a person as 
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you will find," is not reversible error. In Gregg v. State, 
69 Oki. Cr. 103, 101 P.2d 289 ( 1940), defendant was 
charged with and convicted of rape. In his closing argu-
ment to the jury the prosecutor referred to the defend-
ant as a "leacher." The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
held that such reference in prosecutor's closing argument 
"as not error, where the deefndant's guilt was clearly 
established by the evidence. 
In Guldin v. State, 63 Ariz. 223, 161 P.2d 121 ( 1945), 
clefrnclant was convicted of rape of his eight year old 
stcpclaug;hter. Defendants' third assignment of error was 
that the county attorney made the following prejudicial 
n'marks in his argument before the jury: "This defend-
ant is a sex-mad maniac." The Supreme Court reviewed 
the c\·iclcncc in the case and held that such evidence sup-
ported the statement of the county attorney, therefore it 
,,·as not re\Trsible error. 
In the instant case, the phrase criticized by the ap-
pellant is the deduction of the prosecutor from the facts 
Zh related. \\·herein he likens one who steals or takes a 
\oung girl's \·irtuc unto the lowest type person you could 
C\Tr run across. He was using a mere figure of speech 
to strc'is and emphasize the enormity of the offense as 
he vic\\Tcl it. He \\·as only calling to the attention of 
the jury \\·hat every right-thinking person believes. The 
characterization of the defendants' acts, not their racial 
and social background, were in issue. Such statement was 
ju.'itifiecl and permissible and the court did not err in 
m nruling appellants' motion. 
Let us not forget that the defendants were being 
tried for the heinous crimes of rape and robbery. As 
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stated in H'ingatc v. State, 212 So. 2d 44 (Fla. App. 
1970) : 
" ... Certainly the ideal climate for thr con-
duct of a criminal trial is one of fair and cool 
impartiality. Goddend v. State, 141 Fla. ~8. 196 
So. 596 ( 1940). Hm\T\Tr. the emotional wrak-
nesses unto "·hich mrn arc prone ha\T been rec-
ognized by the common la\,. and prm·ision has 
been made for these human fallibilities intruclr 
upon the most experienced prosecuting attorneys."' 
Id. at 45. 
Assuming arguenclo that the manner of closing argu-
ment was prejudicial to the dedndants. it must still be 
considered harmless error. Chapman z•. California, 306 
e.s. l 8 ( 1967). ~Jany jurisdictions ha\"(' enunciated the 
principle that the concept of a ''fair trial'" must not be 
confused with that of a perfect trial. :\n accusccl has 
a constitutional right to a "fair trial" but not ncn·s-
sarily to that seldom experienced rarity of a perfect trial. 
State v. Smith, 119 \\'.\'a. 1-17. 191 S.E. '.>71. 574 ( 1964). 
In light of the m-cn,·hclmint!" amount of n·idencc that 
was brought forward by the State. the closing statement-; 
of the prosecutor \\Tre harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt and would not affect the outcom1· of the trial. 
POI:\IT l II 
THE TRIAL C:Ol 'RT Dll> :\OT ERR I:\ REFl 'SI:\G 
TO EXCCSE PROSPECTIYE .Jl'RORS FOR CAl'SE. 
The court follm\Td lTtah laws and procedure \\hen 
choosing the jury and therefore was not prejudicial in 
its selection. Section 77-10-18 of Utah Code Ann. ( 1953) 
state on what basis a juror can be disqualified. It reads: 
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"A _particular cause for challenge is: (I) For 
such bias as, when the existence of the facts is 
ascertained, in judgment of law disqualified the 
juror, and which is known in this code as implied 
bias. 
" ( 2) For the existence of a state of mind on 
thC' part of the juror which leads to a just infer-
ence in rderence to the case that he will not act 
"·ith entire impartiality, which is known m this 
code as actual bias." 
l'ndcr thr l'tah Code there must be some type of 
bias to disqualify a juror. 
In the instant case the judge in examining the jury 
\\as very exp! icit in determining whether or not each of 
th<' potential jury members was biased. The appellant 
an.rues that the judge should ha\-c dismissed the following 
jurors for cause: \Ir. Dykes, ~Ir. Dee, ~fr. Cherry, Mrs. 
"'ag"taff. \Ir. Herrera. 
:\ppclbnt claims that \Ir. Dykes perjured himself 
\\hen he stated that he had seen the defendants before 
in tm, n. as cldcnclants \\Tre ne,,· to the city. There is no 
e\·i<kncc of record to substantiate appellants' statement 
that .\Ir. Dykes was lyin.g and, in fact, the juror had 
no rca-;on to lie about such an incident. Immediately 
;1ftcr n, kcs informed the court that he had seen the 
ddrndants before. the following discussion took place: 
THE COPRT: Do you feel any prejudice to-
ward the Spanish American people generally? 
.\IR. DYKES: No, Sir. 
THE COl'RT: Do you feel any prejudice to-
ward these two? 
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l\IR. DYKES: No, like I say, I had onlv seen 
them before. I can just recognize the~. 
Later defense further objected to ~Ir. Dykes being 
on the panel because he saw the defendants on 25th 
Street. which would be a prejudice factor in this type of 
case (R. UH). 
The judge re\·ie\\·ecl the e\·iclence stated that the 
juror had indicated that he thought he had seen the clr-
fcndants on 2-1th Street. but that he had never spoken 
to them. The judge then said: 
"I don't think the 2-1th Street area is that 
notorious per sc. I will leave him here." ( R. 10-1-) 
Such C\-idence certainh \\·ould not lead the judge 
to an inference that this juror "·mile! not act "·ith com-
plete impartiality. 
The appellant implies that ~Ir. Cherry \\·as biased 
because he \\·as acquainted \\·ith a murder charge and 
"after thf' trial it was learned that appellants \\Trt' !wing 
investigated in a murclcr case for ,,·hich co-clcfcncla11t 
Batchelor was charged.'' No C'\·idcncc of record tics "\Ir. 
Cherrv's statement into the prior conduct of am of the 
defendants ( R. 8-1. 68) : 
~JR. CHERRY: I ha\·C' no knowledge of this 
court case. I have never hf'en acquainted with 
any rape or robbery charge. I ha\T been ac-
quainted with a murder charge. 
THE COl ~RT: There is no allegation of killinc; 
here. Everybody is alive. 
MR. CHERRY: I ha\T worked with sC\·cral 
Spani.-;h people and I have no prejudice. 
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THE COCRT: All right. 
The appellant implied that Mr. Dee was biased be-
cause of tlw strong frelings he had about rape. An exam-
ination of the record. however, shows that such feelings 
wf'rT discussf'd \\·ith the witness in detail, and the judge 
"·as ju-.;tifiecl in bdieving that such state of mind of Mr. 
Cherry \\·as not of such a nature that he could not ren-
der a fair and unbiased verdict: 
~IR. ~IARSH: ~Ir. Dee, vou indicate that you 
have \Try strong feelings about rape. 
~fR. DEE: Yes. 
~fR. ~L\RSH: \\'hat do you mean by that state-
ment? 
~fR. DEE: \\'ell, it is just that I suppose it is like 
am·boch· else. It has never happened to my 
da~1ght~·r. Providing he is guilty. 
~IR. ~f ARSH: This emotional aversion that 
might affect your verdict of guilt or innocence 
of anv individual? 
~rR. DEE: I doubt it would have any bearing on 
the \Trd ict. just a personal feeling against the 
crime itself. 
~IR. ~L\RSH: I'm sure you have an aversion 
against murder? 
~IR. DEE: Yes. 
~IR. ~L\.RSH: Perhaps some narcotic type 
charge? 
~IR. DEE: Yes, the same. 
~IR. ~lARSH: Is this basically the same type of 
avcrsion'.1 
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l\1R. DEE: Yes. 
l\fR. 1\fARSH: Do vou frel that this aversion 
would have any u~due influence on you? 
MR. DEE: \Yell, I like to think not. I am trying 
to be honest. As far as guilt or innounce is 
concerned, like I sa\·, I don't think it would 
have much bearing,. but then again it might 
be subconscious. 
l\fR. 1\IARSH: You think the fact that a person 
is charged \\·ith a crime is any kind of indica-
tion of guilt or innocence or \\'Oulcl this arouse 
any feeling of an animosity in yourself? 
l\1R. DEE: \Veil. I feel that, in the clue process 
of law and cvcrvthing, if a person is arrested 
and were identified bv the ,·ictim. I frcl that 
there must be some sort of significance to that. 
l\fR. 1\IARSH: You feel that the fact that the 
charge has been made and that an allcQation 
has been made is, in fact, some ,,,·idence of 
the guilt or innocence of the parties im·oln·d:' 
l\fR. DEE: \\'cl, I feel that they ha\T been in-
volved, yes, I don't kno\\' about guilt or inno-
cence. 
The trial judge later specifically addressed himself 
to l\fr. Dec's reservations. He illicitcd the follo\\'ing 
response from 1\lr. Dec and, in fact, all the jurors (R. 
101, 102): 
:MR. 1\fARSH: I would like to add a general 
question, if I may, your Honor. 
Now, 1\lr. Dec has indicated that he has some 
rather strong reservations about the crime of rape 
and the crime of robbery and has indicated that 
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hr feds that the fact that somebody has been 
charged and an allegation has been made, is m 
fact. e\·idencr of -. 
THE COl rRT: (Interposing) Let me put the 
question this way. 
Thr law provides and you ,,·ill be instructed 
at the encl of the trial specifically that the fact 
that a person is charged and brought into trial 
is not n·idence of the guilt. that every person 
starts out in a trial is presumed to be innocent 
and that the presumption which continues until 
the n·idrnce is sufficient to O\Trcome that bevond 
a reasonable doubt, and even then you will ·con-
sider all the evidence either way on it, but every 
person is presumed innocent until you are con-
,·inccd beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. 
This is the basic law. 
The fact that a charge has been made, any 
possible reason that may exist for making the 
charge. if it has any \·alidity or any value at all, 
you "ill hear it. so the mere fact that a charge 
has been made has no relevance as far as guilt 
or innocence is concerned. 
This "·ill be the instruction gi\·en you. Is there 
aI~\ reason \dw ,·ou \\·ill not be able to follow . . . 
that instruction? 
( :'.': o res pome ) 
THE COl'RT: You may continue. 
\IR. \l:\RSH: I have no other questions. 
Appellant made similar objections with respect to 
the juror, \lrs. \\'agstaff. indicating that her feelings 
ari.-.;ing out of another rape case would bias her judgment 
in the c;1sc. Rc,·icw of the record, however, indicates 
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that the trial court did not err in failing to remove this 
juror for cause. 
The judge, exercising his discretion in the matter, 
felt that l\Irs. "'agstaff would be able to render an un-
biased judgment. 
"I think that. judging number 1 Dlrs. \\'ag-
staff), I think she is upset no\\'. I think during 
the trial she will stabilize herself and kno\\' that 
this case is different from the other case." ( R. 1 m) 
Appellant objected to :'.\Ir. Herrera being on the jury 
because he \\·as also a Spanish-American, \\·hich might 
dissuade his thinking. Once again the judge felt this 
juror would be able to render a fair and unbiased judg-
ment in the case. 
"As far as the Spanish-American is concerned. 
I think he is reluctant to han' the responsibility 
and that is the onlv JTason. I think he \\ill mt·a~­
ure up "·hen the cl~ips arc dm,·n. I ,,·ill lcaH· him 
on." ( R. 103) 
As noted abO\T, the l 'tah Code requires there to be 
some type of bias to disqualify a JUror. 
The judge in examining the jury ''as \Try explicit 
in dcte1mining whether or not each of tht' potential 
jury members ,,·as biased. On several occasions he asked 
the jury whether or not they were biased. 
Ctah case law points out that there is no bias if each 
juror states he is impartial and wil try defendant accord-
ing to imtructions. In Sta{(' v. 1\f usser, 110 Utah .13+, 
175 P.2d 724 (19·16), the court held: 
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"On trial of information charaina conspiracy ;-, :-., 
to inducr other-; to practice pol) gamous or plural 
marriages. charge of bias on part of members of 
\lnnnon church called to scr;e on the jury were 
not -;ub-;tantiatecL where each said that he would 
trY case accorclin,g to the evidence and the court's 
instrucion. l\or could defendant object to jurors 
\\·ho had knmdedge that said defendants has been 
excommunicated from ~lormon church for ad-
,·ocatin~ or practicing polygamy, where such in-
formation was com-eyed to jury by their own 
attorneys." Id. at 738. 
In State l'. Com'l0 )', 23 \\'ash. 2d 539, 161 P.2d 442 
(JlJi-'.>). there \\·as no prejudice or bias found even when 
a juror told a third party before trial that he did not 
like the accused and seemed \"Cry antagonistic towards 
him. The court held: 
"\\"here prospectin· juror testified on prelim-
inarv examination that his acquaintance with ac-
cu-.;cd or his family would not weigh with juror 
;rnd that he knew no reason "·hv he could not act 
as a fair and impartial juror, \~·hereupon he was 
passt·d by accused's counsel for cause, affidavit 
that such juror told affiant before trial that juror 
did not like accused and seemed very antagonistic 
to him \\·as insufficient to entitle accused to new 
trial. in absence of any suggestion in record that 
such juror \\·as influenced in his verdict by any 
prejudice against accused." Id. at 446. 
The lmnT court did everything necessary to issue a 
fair and unbiased jury. The mere fact that some of the 
j11rnr-.; mav ha\T had a preconceived notion as to guilt 
or i1111occ11ce. without showing more, is not sufficient 
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to rebuke the presumption of a juror's impartiality. As 
stated in Irvin v. Dodd, 366 tT.S. 722 ( 1961): 
"It is not required. however. that the jurors 
be totally ignorant of the facts and issues im·olvecl. 
In these days of swift, widespread and diverse 
methods of communication. an important case 
can be expected to arouse the interest of the pub-
lic in the vicinity. and scarcely any of those best 
qualified to serve as jurors will not ha\T formed 
somr impression or opinion as to the merits of 
the case. This is particularly true in criminal casrs. 
To hold that the mere existence of any precon-
ceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an 
accused, without more. is sufficient to rebuke the 
presumption of a prospective juror's impartialitv 
would be to establish an impossible standard. It 
is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impres-
sion or opinion and render a \Trdict based on 
the eviednce presented in court." 
One important preliminary consideration to 
be given the issue nm,· raised by appdlant is that 
a wide degree of discretion is \Tsted in a trial 
court in determinin.g whether an impartial jun 
may be obtained. This determination should not 
be overruled unless it mav clcarlv be shown that . . 
the trial court abused it discretion. Annot.. Prr-
trial Publicity in Criminal Case as Affecting De-
fendant\ Rightto Fair Trial-Federal Cases, 10 
L.Ed.2d 1243, ~6(a), at 1266 (1964). 
The trial court in the imtant case, bdirving the 
assertion-; of the prospective jurors that they could render 
a fair and impartial trial, did not abuse its discretion by 
failing to dismiss any of the jurors for cause. 
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POI;\T IV 
THERE IS :\0 CC~ll"LATl\'E, EFFECTIVE ERRORS 
.JCSTIFYJ;\(; A RE\'ERSAL I;\ THE I.:-.;STA:'\T CASE. 
Thr doctrine announced in State v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 
2d :no. '.!8'.! P.'.!cl 323 ( 19:):)), that in some instances 
errors, "·hich when standing alone would not justify 
rc\Trsal. may ha\·e such a cumulative effect so as to 
ckprin· thr accused of a fair trial. is not disputed by 
rr,pondcnt. Hmff\·er. respondent submits that the instant 
cN' docs not meet the degree of error and criteria set 
forth in Stat1· l'. St. Clair, supra. The duty of the appel-
btr court is set forth in 3 l·tah 2d 244: 
On the basis of such appraisal. if the court can say 
"·ith assurance that the e\'idence of the defendants' guilt 
\\a-; -;o clear and con\'incing that no reasonable jury 
could be expected to return a different \'erdict, even in 
the ab-;cnce of the irregularities, then the errors would 
fw ham1Jc.-;s and the \Trdict should be permitted to stand. 
On tlw other hand. if there is a rrasonable likelihood 
that i11 th1· abffnrt' of the errors a different verdict might 
lum b11·11 roufrrnl, a new trial should be granted. (em-
pha-;i-.; added.) 
In the instant case there is no cumulation of errors 
1;0 a' to justify a conclusion that a different \'erdict would 
ha\T been reached by the jury in the absence of such 
rrror-;. In Stat1· v. St. Clair, supra, the cumulation of 
nror.-; -;upportcd this court's finding that it was reason-
;dJh likeh· the \'crdict of the jury would ha\'e been dif-
frn·nt hut for the errors. Howc\'er. the alleged errors in 
the in.'>tant case do not justify such a conclusion. 
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To conclude that a cumulation of errors has pre-
cluded appellant from ha\·ing a fair trial first necPssi-
tates a conclusion that errors \\TIT committed. Respond-
ent submits that this is not the case and that State v. St. 
Clair, supra, is clearly distinguishable. 
Respondent submits that this court should follow 
State v. Sinclair, 15 t:tah 2d 163, 389 P.2d 469 ( 1964), 
wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 1 70: 
"Under our statute (Utah Cod<' Ann. ~77-42-1 
( 1953), which requir<'s that <'tTors "·hich do not 
affect the essential rights of the parties b<' dis-
regarded, we cannot properly int<'rfrtT with the 
jury's \·erdict, unless upon a rruirw of thr who!I' 
case it should apprar that th('rc was error of rnf-
ficicnt gravity that thr rfrfl'nrlant's ri~hts w1 re 
prejudircd in some substantial way. \\'<' ha\T 
found nothing of any such consequence here." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Respondent submits that a review of the whole record 
requires a conclusion that the appellant rcccivccl a fair 
trial and that no error was committed that prejudiced 
appellant in a substantial \\·av. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the jury was convinced from the e\'i-
dencc adduced at the trial of the appellants' guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt. The record substantiates and necessi-
tates a conclusion that no error \Vas committed that re-
sulted in a substantial prejudice to the appellants. There-
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fore. respondent submits that appellants' contentions are 
wholly without merit that the convictions be affirmed. 
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